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ABSTRACT 
In the context of a technology-driven algorithmic approach to criminal justice, this article 
responds to the following three questions: (i) what reasons are there for treating liberal values 
and human rights as guiding for punitive justice; (ii) is preventive justice comparable to 
punitive justice (such that the guiding values of the latter should be applied to the former); and 
(iii) what should we make of preventive measures that rely not so much on rules and orders but 
on ‘technological management’ (where the preventive strategy is focused on eliminating 
practical options)? 
Responding to the first question, a Gewirthian-inspired theory of punishment is sketched―a 
theory that is, broadly speaking, supportive of liberal values and respect for human rights. What 
makes this theory apodictic for any human agent is that it demands respect for the very 
conditions on which any articulation of agency is predicated. 
With regard to the second question, we indicate how a Gewirthian view of the relationship 
between punitive and preventive justice supports the logic of referring to the principles that 
guide the former as a benchmark for the latter; and, we suggest some particular principles of 
preventive justice where the restrictions are targeted at individual agents (whether in their own 
right or as members of classes). 
Finally, we suggest that, although technological management of crime changes the complexion 
of the regulatory environment in ways that might be a challenge to a Gewirthian moral 
community, it should not be categorically rejected. Crucially, technological management, like 
other preventive strategies, needs to be integrated into the community’s moral narrative and 
authorised only to the extent that it is compatible with the governing moral principles. 
 
1. Introduction 
In addition to their ex post penal responses to crime, modern States rely on a variety of ex ante 
preventive strategies. Many such strategies focus on persons―on prospective offenders 
(ranging from individual agents to general classes of agents) as well as potential victims; others 
focus on potential instruments and targets of crime; and others on the locations and 
environments in which crime might be committed. In some cases, the strategy might be an 
extension of mainstream criminal justice, relying on rules or orders backed by coercive threats; 
but, in other cases, various technological instruments might be employed to support, or even to 
supplant, the rules of the criminal law―whether these instruments are water-sprinkler systems 
or spikes that are designed to deter rough sleepers, CCTV surveillance or DNA profiling, golf 
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carts or supermarket trollies that are immobilised if users attempt to take them out of bounds, 
digital locks that exclude the unauthorised, or automated transport systems that simply put 
human operators out of the loop (Brownsword, 2015).  
Such strategies reflect what some see as a movement away from punishment (as generally 
understood)—towards risk management, prevention of crime, preclusion and exclusion of 
persons who are judged to be high risk or dangerous, and collective security (Feeley and Simon, 
1994: 185). This movement, often characterised as ‘actuarial’ or ‘algorithmic’ justice, has not 
been attributed to any specific technological development, but the development of an array of 
modern technological instruments is clearly implicated in this view (and the movement that it 
describes). 
While there might seem to be plenty to be said in favour of preventive justice, there is a concern 
that this approach can detach itself from the principles and practice of punitive justice. 
Seminally, Bernard Harcourt (2007) has cautioned that criminal justice thinking is increasingly 
driven by our realisation that we can make use of new technologies to prevent crime but without 
attention being paid to whether we should so utilise these tools and, in particular, whether such 
use is compatible with an independent theory of just punishment. Harcourt expresses his 
concern as follows: 
The perceived success of predictive instruments has made theories of punishment that 
function more smoothly with prediction seem more natural. It favors theories of 
selective incapacitation and sentencing enhancements for offenders who are more likely 
to be dangerous in the future. Yet these actuarial instruments represent nothing more 
than fortuitous advances in technical knowledge from disciplines, such as sociology 
and psychology, that have no normative stake in the criminal law. These technological 
advances are, in effect, exogenous shocks to our legal system, and this raises very 
troubling questions about what theory of just punishment we would independently 
embrace and how it is, exactly, that we have allowed technical knowledge, somewhat 
arbitrarily, to dictate the path of justice. (Harcourt, 2007: 3) 
When Harcourt refers to theories of just punishment that have a normative stake in the criminal 
law, we can, as he rightly says, draw on a ‘long history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence—[on] 
centuries of debate over the penal sanction, utilitarianism, or philosophical theories of 
retribution’ (Harcourt, 2007:188).1 However, we take the general point to be that, whichever 
of the candidate theories we ‘independently embrace’, we will have a view about the 
justification for an actuarial approach that turns on considerations other than whether the 
technical knowledge that we have ‘works’ in preventing and controlling crime.  
Although Harcourt does not put it in quite such terms, it is clear that where the technologies 
that enable and shape a predictive and preventive approach to criminal justice are themselves 
underwritten by utilitarian thinking―as often will be the case―then the compatibility question 
will be most troubling, not to Benthamites, but to those who do not subscribe to a utilitarian 
theory of punitive justice. Hence, for Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner (2014), the concern 
is precisely that the ‘the preventive endeavour’ is becoming detached from the constraining 
 
1  For a succinct overview, see Honderich. 1969. 
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principles of due process and respect for human rights. According to Ashworth and Zedner, 
while it is widely accepted that the State has a core duty to protect and secure its citizens, 
[t]he key question is how this duty…can be squared with the state’s duty of justice (that 
is to treat persons as responsible moral agents, to respect their human rights), and the 
state’s duty to provide a system of criminal justice…to deal with those who transgress 
the criminal law. Of course, the norms guiding the fulfilment of these duties are 
contested, but core among them are the liberal values of respect for the autonomy of 
the individual, fairness, equality, tolerance of difference, and resort to coercion only 
where justified and as a last resort. More amorphous values such as trust also play an 
important role in liberal society and find their legal articulation in requirements of 
reasonable suspicion, proof beyond all reasonable doubt, and the presumption of 
innocence, Yet, the duty to prevent wrongful harms conflicts with these requirements 
since it may require intervention before reasonable suspicion can be established, on the 
basis of less conclusive evidence, or even in respect of innocent persons. The imperative 
to prevent, or at least to diminish the prospect of, wrongful harms thus stands in acute 
tension with any idealized account of a principled and parsimonious liberal criminal 
law. (Ashworth and Zedner, 2014: 251-252) 
When, as Ashworth and Zedner observe, the practice is to resolve the tension in favour of 
prevention, and when the latest technologies (including AI and machine learning) offer 
instruments that promise to enhance predictive accuracy and preventive effectiveness, liberal 
concerns are inevitably heightened. 
In this context, we pose three questions for those, including ourselves, who are sympathetic to 
the concerns raised by Harcourt and by Ashworth and Zedner. These questions are provoked 
by the case for constraint in preventive endeavours when it rests on the following assumptions: 
(i) that ‘human rights’ and ‘liberal values’ should be treated as guiding for the practice of 
punitive justice; (ii) that the guiding principles for punitive justice should also be applied to the 
practice of preventive justice; and (iii) that ex ante preventive measures will consist primarily 
of coercive orders and rules. Given these assumptions our questions are:  
(i) How are we to respond to utilitarians, communitarians, populists, and others who 
do not accept that ‘human rights’ and ‘liberal values’ should be treated as guiding 
for the practice of punitive justice (and who, therefore, do not accept that such rights 
and values should be guiding for the preventive practice of criminal justice)? 
(ii) How are we to respond to those who contest the assumption that the practices of 
preventive and punitive justice are relevantly similar such that the former should be 
modelled on the (liberal) principles that guide the latter? In particular, are false 
positives and presumptions of innocence in relation to the latter translatable to the 
former; and, to the extent that preventive justice is to be characterised as an exercise 
in risk management rather than denunciation and stigmatisation, why should it be 
likened to punitive justice as it is applied to ‘core’ crime? 
(iii) To the extent that the liberal values and human rights that we take to be central to 
punitive justice have been developed in relation to the use of rules and orders 
backed by coercive threats, do they continue to be relevant if the State’s preventive 
strategy goes beyond coercive rules and orders, relying instead on ‘technological 
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management’2 to limit the practical options that are available to agents? In other 
words, how far do liberal values of punitive justice engage with such an ex ante 
technologically managed approach? 
We will respond to the first of these questions (in Part II) by sketching an approach to punitive 
justice that draws on Alan Gewirth’s moral theory (Gewirth, 1978). The principles that are 
generated by this approach are very similar to those advocated by Ashworth and Zedner but 
our ambition is to demonstrate that they are rationally compelling even if agents are not already 
disposed to accept human rights or liberal values. In Part III, we assess the objections raised 
by the second question. Of course, if our response to the first question is accepted, then much 
less rides on the response to the second question. This is because, if Gewirthian principles of 
justice are accepted as binding, they―and not utilitarian principles―will govern, That is to 
say, even if there are material differences between the punitive and preventive arms of criminal 
justice, and no matter how we characterise the State’s preventive endeavours, it is Gewirthian 
principles that will govern. Finally, in Part IV, we engage with the third question by offering 
some reflections on the use of measures of technological management that are designed to 
preclude the practical possibility of the commission of criminal offences. This takes us beyond 
the scope of the discussion by Ashworth and Zedner. However, to the extent that crime control 
moves in this direction, we need to engage with this manifestation of State force irrespective 
of whether our response to the first question has been accepted. If, as Ashworth and Zedner 
suggest, the justification for using preventive strategies is relatively under-theorised,3 with the 
various and ubiquitous preventive endeavours ‘yet to be mapped, analysed, or rationalized’ 
(Ashworth and Zedner, 2014: 1), this applies a fortiori to technological management. 
2. The First Question: Why Should We Treat Human Rights and Liberal 
Values as Guiding for Punitive (or Preventive) Justice?    
Many States are already signed up to international, regional, or local human rights (and, 
implicitly, liberal) instruments. Although the extent of such States’ commitments will vary in 
practice―some taking compliance with human rights more seriously than others―so long as 
there is at least a formal commitment there is no urgency to defend the proposition that human 
rights should be taken seriously. However, this was not always the case; and it might not 
continue to be the case. In particular, where human rights and liberal values stand in the way 
of practices that are perceived to be beneficial or harm-avoiding, they might be set aside and, 
ultimately, challenged. If so, the question is: how might we justify sticking with human rights 
and liberal values when we can no longer appeal to their widespread recognition or acceptance? 
 
2  By this, we mean the use of technologies (involving the design of products, places, or persons, or the 
automation of processes) to manage the practical options that are available, such management being 
designed (i) to force or to exclude certain actions which, in the absence of this strategy, might be subject 
only to rule regulation or (ii) to exclude human agents who otherwise would be implicated in the 
regulated activities.   
3  The focus in Ashworth and Zedner (2014) is on preventive coercive justice, which presupposes sanctions 
for breach of rules or orders and which is taken to exclude inter alia situational crime prevention. 
Moreover, they also assume that preventive justice is about the reduction of crime rather than its 
elimination. 
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This is where Gewirthian theory becomes relevant as the best shot that we have at making out 
a reasoned case for something like such rights and values. 
We start by explaining why Gewirthian theory should be taken seriously, following which we 
speak briefly to some of the salient features of our thinking concerning punitive justice.  
2.1 Why agents should take Gewirthian theory seriously 
The principal elements of Gewirthian thinking can be put in the following non-technical way. 
It is characteristic of (human) agents―understood in a thin sense akin to that presupposed by 
the criminal law (Morse, 2002: 1065-66)―that they have the capacity to pursue various 
projects and plans whether as individuals, in partnerships, in groups, or in whole communities. 
Sometimes, the various projects and plans that they pursue will be harmonious; but, often, 
human agents will find themselves in conflict or competition with one another as their 
preferences, projects and plans clash. However, before we get to particular projects or plans, 
before we get to conflict or competition, there needs to be a context in which the exercise of 
agency is possible. This context is not one that privileges a particular articulation of agency; it 
is prior to, and entirely neutral between, the particular plans and projects that agents 
individually favour; the conditions that make up this context are generic to agency itself. In 
other words, the deepest and most fundamental critical infrastructure for any community of 
agents is given by the generic conditions of agency (the GCAs).4 It follows that any agent, 
reflecting (whether prudentially or morally) on the antecedent and essential nature of the GCAs 
must regard them as special; and, in the same way, agents must regard acts that compromise 
these conditions as a special kind of wrongdoing.   
Expressing this in the form of a ‘dialectically necessary’ argument, Gewirth submitted that it 
follows from an agent’s (A’s) understanding of the generic needs of A’s own agency (but also 
of every other agent’s agency) that A must demand that fellow agents act with respect for the 
generic conditions (that A must treat him or herself as having a claim right against other agents 
to respect for these conditions). From this Gewirth submits that A (who is consistently guided 
by the needs of agency) must accept that he or she, too, has a duty (owed to other agents) to 
act with respect for the generic conditions. In other words, Gewirth argues that it would be 
incoherent (contradictory) for an agent to view respect for the generic conditions as anything 
other than a matter of both rights against other agents and duties to those agents. The Principle 
of Generic Consistency (the PGC) formally expresses these rights and duties by enjoining 
agents to act in accordance with their own generic rights as well as those of other agents. This 
principle reflects the egalitarian nature of Gewirthian theory: all agents, whatever their 
particular needs, have a common interest in the GCAs. 
Now, putting this more technically, Gewirth’s argument for the PGC may be presented as 
having the following three-stage form (Beyleveld, 2017). It is argued, first (Stage One), that 
the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI) is dialectically necessary for an agent (any 
agent). The PHI states: 
 If an agent wishes to achieve the agent’s chosen purpose E (or act under the agent’s 
chosen purpose P), and doing X or having Y is necessary to do so, then the agent ought 
to do X or pursue having Y, or give up E (or P). 
 
4  For elaboration, see n 6 and accompanying text. 
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In other words, not to accept the PHI is for an agent to imply that he or she is not able to pursue 
any purpose or act under any practical precept.  
However, if there are conditions that are necessary for an agent to achieve the agent’s purposes 
whatever those purposes are and whoever the agent might be5―and there clearly are such 
conditions (viz., the GCAs)6—then it is dialectically necessary for an agent (any agent) to 
consider that the agent ought to defend the agent’s GCAs unless the agent is willing to suffer 
generic damage to the agent’s ability to act. 
From this, it is argued (Stage Two) that it follows that it is dialectically necessary for an agent 
(any agent) to consider that the agent has positive as well as negative rights to the GCAs under 
the will conception thereof. This means that other agents ought not to interfere with the agent’s 
possession of the GCAs against the agent’s will and ought (if able to do so) to aid an agent to 
secure this possession if the agent is unable to secure this possession by the agent’s own 
unaided efforts, and wishes assistance. 
Finally (Stage Three), the argument is that it follows that it is dialectically necessary for the 
agent to accept that all agents equally have these rights to the GCAs, and consequently because 
the agent referred to is any agent, it is dialectically necessary for all agents to accept this. 
No doubt, some will remain sceptical about the validity of this argument, whether (as is often 
the case) because they do not accept that Stage Two follows from Stage One, or that Stage 
Three follows from Stage Two, or because they believe that there is something culturally 
specific about this argument. With these sceptics, there is a debate that is ongoing and, no 
doubt, it is a conversation to be continued (Beyleveld, 1991). That said, there are two respects 
in which sceptics might be prepared to concede that Gewirthian thinking should be taken 
seriously.  
First, there are several versions of the argument to the PGC that, while not dialectically 
necessary (holding good against all agent interlocutors no matter what their default practical 
viewpoint), are dialectally contingent (Beyleveld, 1996). The form of these arguments is one 
of immanent critique (if A holds x (which presupposes y) then A should also hold y or give up 
holding x). For example, the argument might be that, if A holds some particular moral view 
(generally, human rights or liberal values would be a good example but, in the present context, 
we should imagine some other moral position) then, because acting on that view presupposes 
the PGC, A must also recognise the PGC (or give up the moral view in question). For present 
purposes, however, we do not need to discuss precisely how such dialectically contingent 
arguments might go. The point is simply that some who doubt the validity of the dialectically 
necessary argument might be persuaded that, given their own contingent views, it would be 
contradictory to deny being bound by the PGC. 
 
5  Gewirth designates these conditions as necessary goods, but they may also be called generic conditions 
of agency [GCAs], which are categorically instrumental needs for agency, i.e., instrumental conditions 
regardless of E or P. 
 
6  For example, conditions such as, life, and the necessary means to this, accurate information about the 
means to one’s purposes, and sufficient mental equilibrium to make attempts to pursue some E (translate 
a desire for E into action for E). 
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Secondly, in some writing that acknowledges no debt to Gewirth, we can find ideas that cohere 
with the central Gewirthian claim that there are some conditions that agents simply must 
respect because they are critical to the enterprise of human agency itself. For example, to the 
extent that the multifarious theories of ‘global law’ subscribe, in Neil Walker’s words, to ‘the 
idea of a law that is not bound to a particular territorial jurisdiction’ (Walker, 2015: 19) with 
such law ‘claiming or assuming a universal or globally pervasive justification for its 
application’ (22), and to the extent that the prospects for global law turn on ‘our ability to 
persuade ourselves and each other of what we hold in common and of the value of holding that 
in common’ (199), then there might be a bridgehead for a Gewirthian conversation.  Similarly, 
when Shannon Vallor (2016) (who explicitly rejects both utilitarian and deontological ethics 
in favour of a virtue ethics that draws on Aristotle, Confucius, and the Buddha) writes about 
the preconditions for ‘global community’ and for the development of a range of ‘technomoral’ 
virtues, there are moments when there are distinct echoes of Gewirthian thinking.7 Granted, 
this might be no more than a certain convergence of ideas. Nevertheless, in such convergence, 
it seems to be possible to have Gewirthian thoughts without being a card-carrying Gewirthian, 
and even while remaining sceptical about the dialectically necessary argument to the PGC. 
Against this Gewirthian backcloth, we can sketch some of the salient features of our view of 
punitive justice. We must emphasise, though, that this is no more than a sketch; within the 
compass of this article, it is simply not possible to present a comprehensive Gewirthian theory 
of crime and punishment. 
2.2 Wrongdoing and crime 
For Gewirthians, the paradigmatic form of criminal wrongdoing is a direct violation of the 
PGC, infringing the generic rights of one or more agents and evincing a lack of respect for the 
GCAs. The impact on agents whose rights are so violated might be catastrophic (as when it is 
life-terminating) or it might represent an impairment or inhibition to ongoing agency. However, 
the impact of the wrongdoing might also be felt indirectly by other agents (as when it has such 
salience that it undermines trust and provokes defensive strategies). That said, while the direct 
and indirect impact of particular violations of the PGC are variable in their scale and intensity, 
and while some acts of wrongdoing are more serious than others relative to the generic needs 
of agents, in all cases, what makes such acts ‘criminal’ (and fit to be punished) is their 
incompatibility with respect for the context that is presupposed by any community of human 
agents. 
These short remarks invite many questions which we cannot answer here. For example, there 
are questions about whether intent is a necessary condition for criminal wrongdoing; about how 
the State should respond to acts of gross negligence, or to acts that have the practical effect of 
compromising the environment for agency but where the agents in question have not acted 
intentionally, recklessly or carelessly; about whether there are acts or omissions that a 
Gewirthian community may legitimately treat as a criminal wrongdoing even though they do 
not touch and concern the GCAs; and about where the line is to be drawn between criminal 
 
7  For example, at 53, where Vallor remarks that ‘recognition of the good of human security is necessarily 
implied by commitment to global human community; the human race cannot be a community if it no 
longer exists, or if it can no longer flourish in any meaningful sense.’  
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wrongdoing and wrongdoing that warrants no more than an apology, or an act of reparation, 
compensation or restoration, or the like. 
2.3 The definition and general justification of punishment 
Assuming a context of condemnation (of both the offender and the offending act), if our 
working definition of ‘punishment’ is ‘the imposition of “penalties” (or, perhaps, “suffering”) 
on an agent (wrongdoer) in response to that agent’s wrongdoing’, we will need to say more 
about what counts as a ‘penalty’ or as ‘suffering’—and, we will duly do that before we close 
this sub-section of the paper. However, the first point to make about this working definition is 
that, if we adopt it, we will find examples of punishment in more places than the criminal 
justice system. For example, the definition would also include the imposition of penalties by 
parents on their children or by headmasters on their pupils or by sporting associations on their 
members, and so on. While this might well be a useful way of characterising the range of human 
practices that are potentially within this broad field of inquiry, for our purposes, we need to 
narrow the focus.  
Our cognitive interest is in wrongdoing that involves the commission of a criminal offence, in 
agents who commit such offences, and in penalties that are, as HLA Hart put it, ‘imposed and 
administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is 
committed’ (Hart, 2008a: 5). So, stated shortly, our focal case of punishment is the imposition 
of penalties on an offending agent by the authorised officials of a legal system who are acting 
in response to that agent’s commission of a criminal offence.8 
Famously, Hart (2008b: 8-13) proposed that, in developing a theory of punishment, we should 
differentiate between (i) the ‘general justifying aim’ of punishment and (ii) justifying the 
‘distribution’ of punishment in the particular case (to a particular person and of a certain kind 
and degree). If we observe this distinction, how should we characterise the general justificatory 
aim of the institution of punishment or the goodness of punishment?  
Quite simply, our answer is that the justifying aim or goodness of threatening punishment is to 
denounce those acts of wrongdoing that are judged to compromise the GCAs and, where such 
wrongdoing occurs, to respond in a way that signals unequivocally the seriousness of such 
acts.9 In other words, the primary purpose of punishment is to make an unequivocal statement 
about both the gravity of the wrongdoing and the extent of the wrongdoer’s being held to 
account. The gravity of the wrongdoing is such that penance, compensation or restoration is 
not sufficient; there has to be a penalty that underlines the seriousness of the wrongdoing. The 
accountability of the wrongdoer is to the whole community of agents, not to the individual 
 
8  In his Introduction to Hart, 2008a, John Gardner asks why such a focus is prevalent. Why is it that the 
typical bearing of the question ‘Why punish?’ is ‘first and foremost on the actions of public officials, 
rather than first and foremost on the actions of frustrated friends and despairing divorcees’ (at liii). This 
is a good question. We cannot answer it for others; but, for ourselves, it simply reflects our particular 
cognitive interest. 
 
9  Compare Duff (2018: passim), where a two-part formal principle is suggested: first, that there is reason 
to criminalise a type of conduct if, and only if, it constitutes a public wrong; and, secondly, that a type 
of conduct constitutes a public wrong if, and only if, it violates the polity’s civic order. This principle is 
proposed against the backcloth of a liberal republican polity. 
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victim(s) as such.10 It is right that the wrongdoer is stigmatised; it is right that the wrongdoer 
answers to the community. This is not to say that punishment might not have secondary effects, 
that it might deter crime, or disable offenders, and so on. Deterrence of acts that would 
compromise the GCA’s conditions might be viewed as a positive secondary effect of 
punishment but it is not the justifying reason for punishing offenders.11  
Of course, some penal responses might be restrictive of the GCAs for the particular agent and, 
thus, involve a prima facie violation of the generic rights. Prison conditions are hardly 
conducive to agency.  However, in the context of the offender’s lack of respect for the GCAs, 
this is a justified response to the wrongdoing and the wrongdoer. Nothing else would be 
consistent with one’s commitment to the protection of the GCAs. This is not simply a matter 
of fair dealing in relation to those agents who respect these conditions. To be sure, agents who 
damage the GCAs free ride on the respectful behaviour of compliant agents; but, for all agents, 
there is a rational commitment to the defence of the GCAs. In other words, if the State were 
not to respond in a condemnatory and corrective fashion to intentional violation of the GCAs, 
all agents—non-offending and offending agents alike—would have to regard this as incoherent 
and irrational. 
While our answer to the Hartian question reflects the dialectically necessary thrust of 
Gewirthian thinking―no agent can coherently have any other view about such wrongdoing 
and wrongdoers―it might seem to understate the importance of effective protection of the 
GCAs. Arguably, in an ideal-typical Gewirthian community, a lack of respect for the GCAs 
will be so rare that denunciation is sufficient. However, in the real world, where lack of respect 
is widespread, surely deterrence and prevention of acts that compromise the GCAs has to be 
taken far more seriously? Moreover, where the State has at its disposal technological tools that 
can be deployed for the protection of the GCAs, why eschew anything more than denouncing 
wrongdoing and wrongdoers? These are good questions but they misunderstand our position 
which is specifically about the justification of punishment. Where punishment is understood to 
be an ex post State response (and threatened response) to criminal wrongdoing and wrongdoers, 
we are saying that a denunciatory theory is entailed by the logic of the Gewirthian argument. 
However, it does not follow that the State is precluded from trying to prevent acts that might 
compromise the GCAs or, indeed, employ technological instruments for this purpose. To be 
sure, the extent to which such preventive or technological measures might be justified hinges, 
like the justification of punitive justice, on Gewirthian theory, but the function of such ex ante 
measures (albeit measures that might incapacitate or constrain an agent) is not to punish as 
such.     
Although, as we have said, we cannot here offer a comprehensive Gewirthian theory of crime 
and punishment, it is worth pausing over the relationship between the denunciatory (as we 
would have it) character of crime and punishment and the effective protection of the GCAs. In 
a highly pertinent discussion, Alon Harel (2015)―approaching the matter from, so to speak, 
 
10  Donald Trump was exactly right when he condemned the synagogue shootings in Pittsburgh (in October 
2018) as an ‘evil anti-Semitic attack [which] is an assault on all of us [and] an assault on humanity’: see,  
https://globalnews.ca/news/4602729/trump-synagogue-shooting/. For crimes against humanity, see 
Brownsword, 2014. 
 
11  Compare Duff (2018: 237-249) on ‘responsive’ (responding to wrongdoing) and ‘preventive’ (preventing 
wrongdoing) as candidate master principles of criminalisation 
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the opposite direction―argues that effective protection of the basic rights to life and liberty is 
not sufficient; in addition, Harel argues, violation of these rights must be criminalised and, 
what is more, the responsibility for such criminalisation should be constitutionally entrenched. 
Such criminalisation is not grounded on instrumental considerations, such as the more effective 
protection of life and liberty (note what we have said about the relationship between 
denunciation and deterrence as a secondary effect). Rather, criminalisation (and constitutional 
securitisation) is important as a matter of principle. For everyone in the community, it is 
important that violations of basic rights are publicly recognised as criminal wrongs, and that 
there is no encouragement for the view that compliance is a matter of personal discretion or 
goodwill. In this sense, Harel says, rights to life and liberty should not be ‘at the mercy’ of 
others. While Harel’s point is that effective protection of the right to life and liberty is not 
enough, that there must also be public condemnation of acts that violate these rights, and while 
our point is that we start with crime and punishment as a distinctively public act of 
denunciation, in both views it is implicit that the State should operate with both a punitive and 
a preventive justice strategy.   
This leaves the question of what might count as a ‘penalty’ or as ‘suffering’ in response to 
crime. In ordinary language, we might think that the term ‘penalty’ evokes fines or other 
economic sanctions and that ‘suffering’ evokes the infliction of physical pain (as in ‘corporal’ 
punishment). However, we would count as an example of punishment any response by legal 
officials that would otherwise be a violation of the generic rights of those agents who stand 
convicted of a crime, whether the form of that response is to inflict physical pain, to deprive 
the agent of their liberty or property, to banish the agent, or some other such response. From 
this range of possible penal responses, our particular interest in this paper (in line with 
Ashworth and Zedner) is on the deprivation of liberty because, albeit ex post rather than ex 
ante, this is the closest penal analogue to the impact of measures of preventive justice. 
2.4 Just punishment 
In line with the general justification of punishment, particular penal acts should be designed to 
denounce the wrongdoer and, concomitantly, the GCA-compromising wrongdoing; and, if 
punishment is to legitimately denounce an agent as a criminal, it should be applied in a way 
that is neither random nor unfair. Accordingly, we suggest that, in order to be just, the 
application of punishment should be guided by the following principles12:  
• the principle of generic relevance (the wrongdoing at which penal sanctions are 
directed should be such as touches and concerns the GCAs); 
• the principle of accuracy (penal sanctions should be applied only to those agents who 
have committed the relevant offence); 
• the principle of proportionality (the particular penal sanction that is applied should be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the particular wrongdoing―which should be 
assessed relative to the generic needs of agents and relative to the scale and intensity of 
the negative impact on the GCAs); 
 
12  Compare Ashworth and Zedner (2014): see, e.g., their discussion of accuracy (at 68-69), proportionality 
(at 18-19), least restrictiveness, parsimony and necessity (at 254), and precaution (at 120, albeit 
precaution for the sake of collective security rather than individual liberty). 
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• the principle of least restrictiveness (a penal restriction should be imposed only to the 
extent that it is necessary);  
• the principle of precaution (appropriate safeguards should be adopted lest penal 
sanctions are applied to agents who have not committed the relevant offence); and 
• a principle of just compensation.13 
Provided that these principles are observed, we should treat a particular penal response as just. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that the good faith and reasonable application of these 
principles will never lead to the conviction of an innocent agent. However, the potential gap 
between acts that an agent reasonably believes to be just and acts that actually are just is a 
recurrent challenge in our conceptualisation of law. While what is actually the case has 
theoretical primacy, in practice, questions about the legitimacy of ostensibly legal acts hinge 
on what legal officials reasonably and in good faith believe to be the case.14 
3. The Second Question: Are the Practices of Preventive and Punitive Justice 
Relevantly Similar? 
Intuitively, there might seem to be a material difference between punitive and preventive 
criminal justice practices, between convicting John Doe of a crime that he did not commit and 
preventing Richard Roe from committing a crime that he might not have committed. In the 
former case, the injustice seems clear; in the latter case, it perhaps seems less clear. In the 
former, the State incorrectly treats Doe as having done a serious wrong; in the latter, the State 
speculatively treats Roe as having a disposition to do a serious wrong.  If there is anything in 
this, it suggests that the translation of values from punitive to preventive justice is not 
straightforward.  
Similarly, recalling the distinction between ‘core’ crime (where proof of mens rea is required) 
and ‘regulatory’ crime (where no proof of mens rea is required), the thought might occur that 
preventive strategies are more akin to the regulatory parts of punitive justice than they are to 
those parts that process core crimes.  
If such thoughts lead to a challenge to the assumption that the practices of preventive and 
punitive justice are relevantly similar such that the former should be modelled on the (liberal) 
principles that guide the latter, how should we respond? In particular, are false positives and 
presumptions of innocence in relation to the latter translatable to the former; and, to the extent 
that the former is merely a regulatory exercise in risk management rather than denunciation 
and stigmatisation, why should it be likened to punitive justice in its responses to ‘core’ crime? 
 
13  According to Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 as amended by the Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014 (now Section 133 (1ZA)), for the purposes of compensation, a ‘miscarriage 
of justice’ occurs if and only if the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that 
the person did not commit the offence. See, further, R (on the applications of Hallam and Nealon) v The 
Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWCA Civ 355. 
 
14  Compare Beyleveld and Brownsword, 1986, for an analysis of legal judgments that systematically 
preserves the duality between judgments that are in line with the requirements of ‘agent morality’ and 
judgments that are line with ‘act morality’.  
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In this part of the article, we will consider both these lines of thought before outlining some 
basic principles of Gewirthian thinking in relation to measures of preventive justice. 
3.1 False positives, the presumption of innocence, and stigmatisation 
There is more than one way in which it might be unjust to punish an agent, John Doe, for doing 
x―for example, the particular penalty that is applied might be disproportionate to the crime, 
or the wrongdoing is not so serious as to justify criminalisation, or indeed the supposed 
wrongdoing (the doing of x) is actually no kind of wrong. However, we take it that the 
paradigmatic case of punitive injustice is that in which John Doe is convicted of, and punished 
for, a crime that he did not commit. John Doe did not do x; he is a false positive, and the 
community is rightly outraged that the State, in its name, has perpetrated this injustice against 
Doe. When we talk instead about Richard Roe being prevented from committing a crime that 
he might not have committed, we might wonder whether we can meaningfully characterise Roe 
as a false positive and, even if we can, whether the wrong done to Roe is comparable to that 
done to Doe.  
In response, we should look more carefully at the basis on which we classify a person as a false 
positive and what this signifies in the context of punitive and preventive justice; and then we 
can consider the nature of the wrongs done to the ‘innocent’. 
3.1.1 False positives 
What should we make of the thought that it might not be meaningful to characterise Richard 
Roe as a ‘false positive’ where he is prevented from committing a crime that he might not have 
committed as against characterising John Doe as a false positive when he is convicted of a 
crime that he did not actually commit? 
When we say, in the context of an agent having been convicted of a crime, that we believe that 
the agent is a true positive we mean that we believe (typically, on the basis of the evidence and 
the relevant standard of proof) that the agent did commit the offence.  Conversely, if, in this 
context, we say that we believe that the agent is a false positive we mean that we have grounds 
for believing that the agent did not commit the offence. In both cases, though, there is an 
implicit ‘actuality’ (the commission of the crime and who committed it) against which, in 
principle, our classification of the agent can be cross-checked. If that actuality is at odds with 
our classification, our classification is incorrect. Even if we have grounds for believing that 
John Doe committed the crime, and even if by the standards of the criminal justice system we 
have grounds for characterising John Doe as a true positive, that is an incorrect classification 
if John Doe did not actually commit the crime. If an agent did not actually commit the crime, 
that agent is innocent no matter that all the evidence points to the guilt of the agent. In the final 
analysis, it is the actuality that is the arbiter of our innocence and our guilt.  
Now, the objection is that this paradigm cannot be translated to the case of an agent who, rather 
than being convicted of an offence, is restricted by preventive measures. Quite simply, this is 
because, in the context of prevention, there is no analogue for the actual commission of the 
offence. In a preventive context, if we say that an agent is a true positive, we mean that we 
believe that the agent is correctly classified as one who, but for the preventive intervention, 
would have gone on to commit an offence; and, if we say that an agent is a false positive, we 
mean that we believe that the agent is incorrectly classified as one who would have gone on to 
commit an offence. However, so the objection runs, because the opportunity to offend was 
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eliminated, we cannot meaningfully discuss the truth or falsity of the proposition that, but for 
the preventive intervention, the agent would have committed the offence. The most that we can 
do is form a belief about whether the agent would or would not have done so. There is no 
‘actuality’ against which our classification of the agent can be cross-checked, no actuality to 
act as the arbiter of the agent’s innocence or guilt―or, at any rate, this is so unless there is 
some exceptional supervening event, such as the agent dying the instant that the preventive 
measure is taken. 
That said, insofar as we are classifying agents on the basis of our reasonable beliefs, there is 
some comparability between the classification of agents as true or false positives in both the 
context of conviction and punishment and that of prevention. Granted, the evidence that is 
treated as relevant to the belief differs from one context to another. In the context of conviction 
and punishment, the focus is on the offence-related conduct of the agent; but, in the context of 
prevention where, let us suppose, the agent’s profile provides the evidence, the assessment is 
about character, prior conduct, and disposition. In both cases, moreover, our beliefs can be 
reviewed and revised depending on the evidence. If we could always access the actuality in the 
context of an offence having been committed, this comparability would not be 
significant―because we would do just that and eliminate false positives. However, although 
in principle there is an actuality against which to cross-check the correctness of our 
characterisation of agents who are convicted of crimes as innocent or guilty, in practice, we 
simply do not have access to it. The reality is that, in practice, criminal justice practitioners 
operate in a world of procedural propriety and reasonable grounds for belief. Whether we are 
characterising an agent who is punished or an agent who is prevented as a true or a false 
positive, our description is based on our beliefs. In practice, what will prompt a reclassification 
(from true positive to false positive) is not some kind of revelation of whether the agent 
‘actually did it’ or ‘would have done it’ but new evidence and a fresh appraisal of one’s beliefs 
and the grounds for one’s beliefs.15 The media might talk the talk of whether some agent was 
‘actually innocent’ of the crime but, for practitioners, it is a question of following the right 
process and forming beliefs that are based on reasonable grounds.16  
Given that, in practice, the characterisation of agents who are convicted of crimes as true or 
false positives operates in a realm of justified belief without recourse to an independent 
actuality, there is no problem in employing a similar characterisation of agents who are 
subjected to preventive measures as true or false positives. In both cases, punished agents and 
prevented agents, the labelling of an agent as a true or false positive reflects a belief based on 
evidential grounds. Granted, the evidence that is treated as relevant in the context of punitive 
justice might be different to that relied on in the context of preventive justice. Nevertheless, in 
practice, and in both contexts, the characterisation of an agent as a true or false positive hinges 
on the evidence not the ‘actuality’. 
 
15  Compare R (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] UKSC 18, in which the majority held that 
compensation should be available for a miscarriage of justice only where (1) the fresh evidence showed 
clearly that the defendant was innocent of the crime of which he had been convicted or (2) the fresh 
evidence so undermined the evidence against the defendant that no conviction could possibly be based 
upon it. The minority view was even more restrictive. 
  
16  Compare Nobles and Schiff, 2000. 
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3.1.2 Stigmatisation and wrong 
It might be argued that the wrong done to an innocent defendant by a criminal conviction and 
punishment is not comparable to the wrong done to an agent who is innocent in the sense that 
the preventive measure was unnecessary. In the former case, there is always a public display 
of stigmatisation; in the latter case this might not be so―it is simply premature to blame and 
shame agents who have not yet committed a crime.  
We suggest that one strand of this argument is a distraction from the central issue. This is the 
strand that focuses on how citizens regard, respectively, those agents who are punished and 
those who are simply prevented. Here, it will be noted that both the contexts in which agents 
are classified as high risk and the consequences of such classification are quite varied. For 
example, if algorithms are used by low level courts to make decisions about bail, the 
classification of an agent as high risk takes place in a public arena and the consequences of 
being so classified (of bail being denied) are serious. There might not yet be blame and shame 
but there is stigmatisation; the denial of bail signals that this is a person who cannot be trusted 
to return to court, or one who might interfere with evidence or intimidate witnesses and so on. 
Elsewhere, the application of algorithms might be less public, the decisions made might be 
more administrative; and, in some cases, the decision might impact on a group of agents, 
without any one in particular being singled out. In contexts of this kind, the reputation of those 
who are classified as high risk might not suffer in the eyes of one’s fellow agents. On this 
analysis, there will be some cases where preventive justice looks very much like punishment 
but others in which it looks rather different. However, we suggest that this is not the central 
issue and tends to cloud the matter. 
From a Gewirthian perspective, while the distress occasioned to innocent agents by public 
denunciation or stigmatisation and, then, the consequential damage in the eyes of one’s peers 
is unjust, it is not the fundamental injustice. Rather, in a community of rights, the State relates 
to agents in a way that treats them as presumptively disposed to respect the GCAs. This 
presumption is not rebutted until, in the case of punitive justice, the State proves beyond all 
reasonable doubt that an agent has failed to respect the GCAs. This rebuttal hinges on holding 
a particular agent responsible for some offending act. Moreover, even if an agent has a history 
of offending, cases are judged one at a time and there is a reluctance to allow prior conduct or 
character to be admitted in a way that unfairly prejudices the determination of the court. Yet, 
when the State takes individualised preventive measures, it treats an agent as though they are 
disposed to commit a crime without the criminal conduct having taken place. By doing this, 
the State treats the presumption that the agent is disposed to respect the GCAs as rebutted. 
What rebuts the presumption is not that the State judges that the agent has committed the 
offence but that the agent’s ‘profile’ (notoriously a profile that takes into account an agent’s 
racial or ethnic origins) indicates a certain likelihood of the agent offending. The profile, in 
other words, takes over as a proxy for criminality.  
In both cases, punitive and preventive, the State is making an adverse moral judgment about 
the agent; in both cases, the protection of the presumption of innocence is forfeited; and it is 
this adverse moral judgment and change of presumption that is critical. In short, the State might 
unjustly treat the presumption of innocence as rebutted where the evidence does not warrant it 
or where it simply gets it wrong; and this applies equally whether we are dealing with John 
Doe who did not commit the crime or Richard Roe who would not have committed the crime. 
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To this, we can add a coda. The paradigmatic case of injustice, we have said, is that in which 
John Doe is convicted of a crime that he did not commit. However, there is also an injustice if 
John Doe did commit the act with which he is charged but where the act (the doing of x) should 
not be criminalised. Now, a particular case of the latter is where a criminal offence is broadened 
in ways that include otherwise innocent acts or where such acts are themselves made the subject 
of new discrete offences.17 If the justification for extending the scope of the crimes in question 
is that big data analysis indicates that there is some correlation between these newly 
criminalised acts and a propensity to commit crime in general or the main offence in particular, 
liberals will rightly question such reasoning: correlation is not equivalent to, and does not 
entail, causation (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013); and judging an agent on the basis of 
their supposed character is not judging them on the basis of their conduct (Lacey, 2016). It 
follows that liberals must also think that there is no justification for treating the innocent acts 
(the doing of x) as a proxy for criminality or crime and then taking preventive measures against 
Richard Roe. If it is unjust to apply punitive measures to innocent acts by John Doe, it must 
also be unjust to apply preventive measures to such acts by Richard Roe.18    
3.2 Preventive justice as risk management 
In United States v Salerno and Cafaro,19 one of the questions was whether detention under the 
Bail Reform Act 1984 should be treated as a punitive or as a preventive ‘regulatory’ measure. 
The majority concluded that such detention clearly falls on the regulatory side of the line and 
that ‘preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.’20 Suppose, then, that 
the State, characterising its preventive measures as ‘essentially regulatory’, sets up a 
Department for Management of Public Risks and Prevention. The Department’s mission is to 
make preventive interventions for the sake of protecting the generic conditions, whether the 
risk is represented by agents who would otherwise commit serious criminal offences or by 
agents who are carriers of dangerous diseases or who are seriously mentally disordered. The 
philosophy of the Department is that no one should be blamed or shamed; it is simply a matter 
of assessing risk and taking appropriate precautionary measures. Adverse moral judgments are 
not being made; and, according to the Department, it is a mistake to liken preventive justice to 
the administration of punishments. 
However, so long as we are dealing with prevention that is designed to prevent harm to the 
GCAs, where the threat is presented by human agents who intentionally (or recklessly) act in 
ways that compromise the commons conditions, the risk that is being managed is of a special 
nature. Quite simply, we should not equate an intentional lack of respect for the GCAs with an 
act that unintentionally causes harm to the environment for human health and agency. To 
suggest that the preventive measures in all such cases are ‘just risk management’ or ‘just 
 
17  Compare, Duff, 2018: 288-292 and 322-332; and Macdonald and Dus, 2019. 
 
18  We should also note (but cannot here discuss) the non-ideal case where an act that should be criminalised 
(because it compromises the GCAs) is not criminalised. In such a case, the question is whether there is 
any room for the use of ex ante preventive measures as a justifiable corrective for the ex post deficiency 
in the law. 
  
19  (1987) 481 US 739. 
 
20  Ibid., at 747. 
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regulatory’ is to lose sight of the special nature of the GCAs; it is reductive and it misleadingly 
flattens the range of regulatory responsibilities. When there are threats to the GCAs, it is not a 
matter of finding a reasonable accommodation of competing interests; it is not routine politics. 
Accordingly, whatever we call the Department with a preventive mission, its work in 
preventing intentional or reckless harm to the GCAs is closely linked to the work of the criminal 
justice agencies in prosecuting and punishing agents who commit GCA-compromising 
offences. In this light, we suggest that it is appropriate to apply the standards of core criminal 
justice to both the punitive and the preventive arms of the enterprise.21 
Whatever we make of this objection and response, it bears repetition that it does not follow that 
we should make any concession to the Department’s implicit utilitarian thinking. Even if just 
prevention is materially different to just punishment, as Gewirthians, we will continue to hold 
that it should be guided by the PGC. However, we also suggest that it does not follow that we 
should concede that the Department can distance itself from making any adverse moral 
judgments. We all understand that no adverse moral judgment should be made about an agent 
who is an innocent carrier of a dangerous disease. However, it is not so clear that no adverse 
moral judgment should be made about an agent whom we believe is highly likely to commit a 
crime. Granted, where we draw on a profile to judge an agent’s propensity or character, there 
has to be a provisionality in our judgment. Nevertheless, the judgment that we make is of a 
moral kind; our reasons for taking preventive measures are moral; and, although our judgment 
is corrigible, so long as it holds it is adverse.     
3.3 Applying Gewirthian theory to preventive justice 
In a Gewirthian community of rights, it will be axiomatic that punishments should be applied 
only to those agents whom we reasonably believe to have committed a criminal offence.  For 
this reason, a theory of just punishment will provide for precautionary safeguards that minimise 
the risk of convicting and penalising the innocent―for example, the safeguards provided by 
the presumption of innocence and, concomitantly, by the requirement that the prosecution 
should prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. In the same way, a theory of just prevention 
 
21  Compare the minority opinion of Marshall J (joined by Brennan J) in US v Salerno and Cafaro (n 19) at 
760: 
Let us apply the majority's reasoning to a similar, hypothetical case. After investigation, Congress 
determines (not unrealistically) that a large proportion of violent crime is perpetrated by persons who are 
unemployed. It also determines, equally reasonably, that much violent crime is committed at night. From 
amongst the panoply of ‘potential solutions,’ Congress chooses a statute which permits, after judicial 
proceedings, the imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew on anyone who is unemployed. Since this is not a 
measure enacted for the purpose of punishing the unemployed, and since the majority finds that 
preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal, the curfew statute would, according 
to the majority's analysis, be a mere ‘regulatory’ detention statute, entirely compatible with the 
substantive components of the Due Process Clause. 
The absurdity of this conclusion arises, of course, from the majority's cramped concept of substantive 
due process. The majority proceeds as though the only substantive right protected by the Due Process 
Clause is a right to be free from punishment before conviction. The majority's technique for infringing 
this right is simple: merely redefine any measure which is claimed to be punishment as ‘regulation,’ and, 
magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its imposition. 
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should seek to be applied only to true positives with appropriate precautionary measures to 
safeguard against unjust restrictions on false positives. 
However, what should the community treat as ‘appropriate’? How precautionary (relative to 
the interests of potential false positive agents) should preventive justice be? We might say that 
the State should be confident that an agent whose options might be reduced by the particular 
measure would otherwise act in ways that compromise the GCAs, or that there is clear and 
convincing evidence that this is the case, or that it is a virtual certainty that the agent would, 
but for preventive intervention, so act.22 These various locutions imply that the evidence should 
at least indicate that it is more likely than not that the agent would otherwise so act, but how 
much more does the State require? Should the community demand, in a way that is analogous 
to punitive justice, that the evidence should indicate beyond all reasonable doubt that the agent 
would otherwise so act? While the community certainly should not authorise the insouciant use 
of broad sweep measures (such as curfews) that reduce both legitimate and illegitimate options, 
and where it is known that there will be some statistical (albeit not identifiable) false positives, 
how demanding should the standard of preventive proof be when agents are restricted either in 
their own right or as members of a class or group?  
The closest analogue between the application of punitive and preventive measures is where 
such measures are applied to a discrete individual agent. Generally, defendants in a criminal 
trial speak to their own actions and not the actions of some class of which they happen to 
members. If the application of preventive measures is guided by such a punitive case, where 
an individual agent is singled out for restrictive measures, the ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ 
standard should be applicable. However, in many instances, preventive measures will be 
applied to agents who happen to fit some class profile. Such agents are not being singled out 
as such; the restriction is class-wide. Nevertheless, when class-wide measures are precisely 
where there are likely to be false positives, it makes no sense for liberals to apply a lower 
standard of preventive proof. In other words, the preventive standard should be the same 
whether Richard Roe is singled out as a discrete individual agent or is caught by restrictions 
that are applied to a class of agents of which he is a member. In both cases, the State should 
satisfy a beyond any reasonable doubt standard.  
Accordingly, drawing on the general principles of Gewirthian theory in conjunction with the 
principles of punitive justice already sketched, we suggest that the key principles of preventive 
justice are: 
(i) that the State should act only on evidence that indicates beyond all reasonable doubt 
that the agent who is restricted would otherwise have committed a crime (relating 
to the protection of the GCAs); 
 
(ii) that whatever restrictions are imposed should be no more than are necessary and 
proportionate relative to the protection of the GCAs; and 
 
 
22  Compare the majority in US v Salerno and Cafaro (n 19) at 750-751 (rejecting the idea that the Act is ‘a 
scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of…serious crimes’ and treating it as 
requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to 
an individual or the community’). 
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(iii) that the agent who is so restricted should have the right to respond to the preventive 
measures (a) by requiring the State to explain its reasons for believing (beyond all 
reasonable doubt) that the agent would have otherwise committed a crime and/or 
(b) by challenging the necessity and proportionality of the restriction.23  
Undoubtedly, this sets a high bar for preventive justice. The evidence for justified preventive 
restriction needs to be as compelling as that for justified conviction and punishment; and the 
burden of explanation on the State is no different. So, to the extent that the State seeks to rely 
on algorithmic prediction, it might not yet be able to meet these standards. If the State cannot 
show that the algorithms indicate the need for restriction beyond all reasonable doubt, or 
explain how the algorithms work, the State will need more.24 Even if there is some loss of 
utility we should stick to our principles (Pasquale, 2015). The distinctive response of a 
Gewirthian community (echoing Harcourt) is that it is for the technology to come into line with 
the principles, not the other way round. 
4. The Third Question: Can We Apply Human Rights and Liberal Values to 
Prevention by the Technological Management of Practical Options? 
One afternoon in March 2017, Khalid Masood intentionally drove a car into pedestrians on 
Westminster Bridge; and, a few weeks later, on a busy Saturday night, three men drove a white 
van into pedestrians on London Bridge before jumping out carrying knives and heading for 
Borough Market where they killed and injured many people. Actions of this kind clearly 
involve a violation of the GCAs—quite simply, the primary impact was on the generic rights 
of the agents who were killed or injured but there was also a secondary impact insofar as the 
acts created an environment of fear that is not conducive to agency. In the absence of respect 
for the life, the physical integrity, and the psychological security of agents, while some agents 
might act ‘defiantly’, it is likely that others will not act freely but rather in a way that is 
defensive, non-trusting, and inhibited. How should we respond to such wrongdoing? 
Already, the emphasis of the global response to ‘terrorism’ is on prevention. The intelligence 
services are expected to monitor ‘high risk’ persons and intervene before they are able to 
translate their preparatory acts (which themselves might be treated as serious criminal offences) 
into the death of innocent persons. Alongside such measures, the State’s preventive strategy 
might incorporate elements of ‘technological management’, where force is exercised not by 
making rules and orders backed by coercive sanctions but by limiting the availability of 
practical options. For example, concrete barriers might be installed on bridges to prevent 
vehicles mounting the pavements; GPS-enabled protective fences might be used to disable 
entry into high-risk areas (Paton, 2017); and, in future, autonomous vehicles might be designed 
so that they can no longer be used as lethal weapons.25 So, prevention is already the name of 
this game and, according to the public narrative, the smarter the prevention the better. The 
 
23  Compare Koops, 2013, esp at 212-213. 
 
24  Nb the cautionary remarks about judicial reliance on algorithmic tools in State of Wisconsin v Loomis 
881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
 
25  Apparently, when a truck was driven into a crowd at a Christmas market in Berlin in 2016, the impact 
was mitigated by the vehicle’s automatic braking system which was activated as soon as a collision was 
registered: see Parris, 2017. 
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question is: how far do rights (Gewirthian or human) or liberal values engage with the use of 
general technological management to prevent the commission of crime by constraining the 
practical options of agents? 
While technological management might share precisely the same regulatory purposes as 
counterpart rules of the criminal law, it differs from rule-based responses (whether they are ex 
post or ex ante) in the following critical respect. Technologically managed prevention does not 
give agents either moral or prudential reasons for compliance; rather, it focuses on reducing 
the practical options that are available to agents (Brownsword 2017). The question is whether, 
even if such prevention is more effective in protecting the GCAs than the traditional rules of 
the criminal law or ex ante preventive rules or orders, it is compatible with our general moral 
theory and, in particular, with our thinking in relation to just punishment and prevention.26  
Shannon Vallor (2016: 203), discussing techno-moral virtues, (sous)surveillance, and moral 
nudges, presents readers with a relevant hypothetical. Imagine, she suggests, that Aristotle’s 
Athens had been ruled by laws that ‘operated in such an unobtrusive and frictionless manner 
that the citizens largely remained unaware of their content, their aims, or even their specific 
behavioral effects.’ In this regulatory environment, we are asked to imagine that Athenians 
‘almost never erred in moral life, either in individual or collective action.’ However, while 
these fictional Athenians are reliably prosocial, ‘they cannot begin to explain why they act in 
good ways, why the ways they act are good, or what the good life for a human being or 
community might be.’ Without answers to these questions, we cannot treat these model citizens 
as moral beings. Quite simply, their moral agency is compromised by technologies that do too 
much regulatory work. 
This leads to the following cluster of questions: (i) are measures of technologically managed 
prevention necessarily incompatible with Gewirthian moral aspiration; (ii) how do such 
measures compare to strategies for crime reduction that rely on practical and moral reason; and 
(iii) even if capable of general justification, should such prevention be treated as a strategy of 
last resort? However, before responding to these questions, we should note the concerns that 
have already been raised about the hidden racial bias of apparently colour-blind algorithms 
used for bail and sentencing decisions (Corbett-Davies et al, 2016; O’Neil, 2016). If a 
preventive approach that employs such technologies, albeit not directly discriminatory, 
exacerbates the unfairness that is otherwise present in criminal justice practice, it cannot be the 
strategy of choice.27 Accordingly, when comparing and contrasting technologically managed 
prevention with traditional ex post criminal justice strategies, we will do so on a ceteris paribus 
basis. 
4.1 Are measures of technologically managed prevention compatible with Gewirthian 
moral aspiration? 
Let us assume that questions about technological management are being posed in a community 
where the State relies on both ex post penal and ex ante preventive measures and where agents 
are not uniformly disposed to respect the GCAs. In such a community, the State’s reliance on 
 
26  Compare Kerr 2010, and Gavaghan 2017.  
 
27  For a searching critique of the problems presented by indirect algorithmic discrimination, see Hacker, 
2018. 
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ex ante preventive rules and orders might already signal that the default is no longer that agents 
are presumed to be disposed to comply with the PGC; and, this might be problematic relative 
to the community’s general moral aspirations. To the extent that technological management 
replaces such rules and orders, it might reinforce that signal; and, where technological 
management replaces ex post penal rules, this might signal a fresh encroachment on the 
presumption of innocence. In either case, however, the use of technological management does 
not seem to raise questions that are not already provoked by (or would be provoked by) the use 
of ex ante preventive rules and orders.  
Rather, as we have said, the distinctive question raised by reliance on technological 
management is that it dispenses with governance through rules (whether ex ante or ex post) 
and reduces the range of rule-guided zones. The thought is that the preservation of such zones 
might be important because this is where there is a public accounting for our conduct, this is 
where agents come to appreciate the nature of their most important rights and responsibilities, 
and this is where agents develop their sense of what it is to do the right thing (Brownsword, 
2011).28 In our representative community, how might technological management impact on 
agents? 
First, there are agents who are disposed (for moral or prudential reasons) to comply with GCA-
protective rules. Where compliers act on moral reasons, the introduction of technologically 
managed prevention means that these agents (a) lose the opportunity to show that their 
compliance is morally inspired (that they are ‘respectable’ citizens: compare Wells, 2008) and 
(b) possibly no longer view compliance as a moral requirement (compare Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2009). Arguably, in an aspirant community of rights, the latter is a more serious 
concern than the former. However, provided that there is an awareness of this risk, it should be 
possible to maintain the sense of moral obligation even in a context of reduced practical 
possibility for non-compliance―but it will take some effort to do so. As for those agents who 
are disposed to comply only for longer-term prudential reasons, the loss of opportunity to show 
that one’s compliance is morally inspired would seem to be less important. To be sure, we 
might be concerned that such agents are not fully morally committed to the protection of the 
GCAs; but they present no threat to the GCAs and it is not obvious that employing measures 
of technologically managed prevention to protect the GCAs (rather than relying on the longer-
term disposition of prudential compliers) involves any additional loss of opportunity to engage 
morally with these agents.  
Secondly, there are agents who are not disposed to comply with GCA-protective rules and who 
will not comply if, opportunistically, they see short-term prudential gains by breach. Prima 
facie, the fact that technologically managed prevention forestalls such opportunistic breach is 
a good thing. However, if effective prevention means that agents who are prudential non-
compliers might fly below the radar―and that opportunities for moral engagement that come 
with the commission of offences are lost―this might be a more general concern (compare 
Wells, 2008).  
 
28  Compare, too, Anthony Duff’s caution against changing the (rule-based) regulatory signals so that they 
speak less of crime and punishment and more of rules and penalties (Duff, 2010, esp at 104). According 
to Duff, where the conduct in question is a serious public wrong, it would be a ‘subversion’ of the 
criminal law if offenders were not to be held to account and condemned. See, too, the argument in Harel, 
2015. 
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Thirdly, there are agents who, even though generally disposed to comply with GCA-protective 
rules, now resist on moral grounds. If what the State treats as an ostensibly GCA-protective 
intervention is crazy, or if there is a reasonable disagreement about whether an ostensibly GCA-
protective measure is actually GCA-protective, then the loss of opportunity for conscientious 
objection is an issue. Recalling the famous case of Rosa Parks, who refused to move from the 
‘white-only’ section of the bus, Evgeny Morozov (2013) points out that this important act of 
civil disobedience was possible only because ‘the bus and the sociotechnological system in 
which it operated were terribly inefficient. The bus driver asked Parks to move only because 
he couldn’t anticipate how many people would need to be seated in the white-only section at 
the front; as the bus got full, the driver had to adjust the sections in real time, and Parks 
happened to be sitting in an area that suddenly became “white-only”’ (204). However, if the 
bus and the bus-stops had been technologically enabled, this situation simply would not have 
arisen—Parks would either have been denied entry to the bus or she would have been sitting 
in the allocated section for black people. Morozov continues: 
Will this new transportation system be convenient? Sure. Will it give us Rosa Parks? 
Probably not, because she would never have gotten to the front of the bus to begin with. 
The odds are that a perfectly efficient seat-distribution system—abetted by ubiquitous 
technology, sensors, and facial recognition—would have robbed us of one of the 
proudest moments in American history. Laws that are enforced by appealing to our 
moral or prudential registers leave just enough space for friction; friction breeds 
tension, tension creates conflict, and conflict produces change. In contrast, when laws 
are enforced through the technological register, there’s little space for friction and 
tension—and quite likely for change. (205) 
In an aspirant community of rights, it will be a matter of concern that agents such as Rosa 
Parks—particularly agents who are otherwise moral compliers—are either forced to act against 
their conscience or are unable to demonstrate their conscientious objection. Accordingly, in 
this kind of case, it is arguable that technologically managed prevention should be avoided; 
regulators should stick with rules. 
In practice, it has to be recognised that agents will not always fit neatly into these categories 
and their dispositions might not be constant.29 Hence, assessing the impact of technologically 
managed prevention is far from straightforward, the costs are uncertain, and human agents are 
not all alike. Nevertheless, technologically managed prevention does not seem to be such an 
obviously costly strategy for a community of rights that it simply should not be contemplated. 
4.2 Comparing technologically managed prevention with other strategies 
How does technologically managed prevention compare with moral and prudential strategies 
for discouraging and dealing with serious crime? And, how do those latter strategies compare 
with one another? 
First, how does technologically managed prevention compare with ex post moral reason 
applied in a penal setting? Famously, Anthony Duff (1986) has argued that the State should 
respect citizens as autonomous agents and should treat offending agents as ends in themselves. 
Whether, like Duff, we take a Kantian perspective or a Gewirthian-derived view such as our 
 
29  Compare Hildebrandt, 2010. 
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own, we see that, even within traditional institutions of criminal justice, there is an opportunity 
for moral education, both at the trial and, post-conviction, in rehabilitative penal institutions. 
However, even when practised in an exemplary fashion, this moral dialogue with the criminal 
does not guarantee the safety of innocent agents; and, where the decisive educational 
intervention comes only after the GCAs and innocent agents have already been harmed, this 
might seem to be too little too late. The thought persists that technologically managed 
prevention might be a better option—or, at any rate, it might be a better option so long as its 
preventive measures can be integrated into the community’s moral narrative. 
Secondly, a strategy that relies on adjusting the prudential disincentives against offending—
for example, by intensifying surveillance or by making the penal sanctions themselves even 
more costly for offenders—invites a two-way comparison: first, with a strategy that relies on 
moral reason; and, secondly, with technologically managed prevention. How might a 
prudential strategy fare if compared in this way? Although the criminal justice system that 
relies on prudential reasons remains a communicative enterprise, the register is no longer 
moral. Such a deviation from the ideal-type of a communicative process that focuses on moral 
reasons might be judged to be a cost in and of itself; and, if the practical effect of prudentialism, 
for both compliers and offenders is to crowd out moral considerations,30 the consequences 
involve a cost. Nevertheless, the selling point for such a prudential strategy is that agents who 
are capable of making reasonable judgments about what is in their own interest will respond in 
the desired (compliant) way and that this will protect innocent agents against avoidable harm. 
Of course, this sales pitch might be over-stated. There is no guarantee that regulatees will 
respond in the desired way to a switch from moral exhortation to prudential sanctions (Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2009); and, neither is there a guarantee that they will make the overall 
prudential calculation that regulators expect. At this point, technologically managed prevention 
becomes the relevant comparator. If we want to reduce the possibilities for regulatees to 
respond in their own way to the State’s prudential signals, then technologically managed 
prevention looks like a serious option. To be sure, such prevention gives up on any idea of a 
communicative process, moral or prudential. Practical options are simply eliminated; agents 
are disabled or incapacitated, or they are presented with places, products, and processes that 
limit their possibilities for non-compliance. If technologically managed prevention can 
outperform prudentialism, and if its restrictions can be integrated into the community’s moral 
narrative, this looks like a serious candidate.   
Thirdly, as we have just said, technologically managed prevention might offer more effective 
protection of the GCAs than any other strategy. However, if it cannot be integrated into the 
community’s moral narrative, this is a major cost; and if it means that we lose what is otherwise 
an opportunity to reinforce the moral message or, as we have already suggested, to re-educate 
those who have not internalised the moral principles, this is again a cost.31 Stated shortly, this 
is the dilemma: if we act ex post, for some innocent agents, the State’s moral reinforcement 
might be too late; but, if the State employs technologically managed prevention ex ante, we 
 
30  For relevant insights about the use of CCTV, see, Larsen, 2011; similarly, with regard to the impact of 
reliance on prudential considerations, see Gneezy and Rustichini, 2009. 
 
31  Compare Rich, 2013. 
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might weaken the community’s moral narrative and we might not realise that, for some agents, 
there is a need for moral reinforcement. 
Our provisional conclusion is that it is not obvious, a priori, which strategy should be prioritised 
or which combination of strategies will work best in protecting the GCAs while also assisting 
the community to realise its moral aspirations. Whatever strategy is adopted, its impact will 
need to be monitored; and, so far as technologically managed prevention is concerned, a key 
challenge is to find ways of it being fully integrated into the community’s moral narrative. 
4.3 Even if it is capable of general justification, should technologically managed 
prevention be treated as a strategy of last resort? 
While we do not see any reason, a priori, for treating technologically managed prevention as a 
strategy of last resort, we say this subject to the following three reservations. 
First, the use of technological management should be compatible with the Rule of Law. This 
means that the use of technological management as a regulatory strategy needs to be compatible 
not only with the protection of the GCAs but also with the distinctive (constitutive) values of 
a particular community. Whereas compatibility with the GCAs is a coherence requirement for 
all communities of agents, compatibility with the constitutive values of a particular community 
is a matter of local coherence (Brownsword, 2016a, 2018; Gavaghan, 2017). So, if a particular 
community does regard technological management as a strategy of last resort, and assuming 
that this is compatible with respect for the GCAs, then its aversion to technological measures 
should be respected.    
Secondly, to repeat, the case of moral controversy and conscientious objection is troubling 
(Morozov, 2013; Brownsword, 2016b). For a community with moral aspirations, if a strategy 
that compels an agent to do x (or that prevents an agent from doing y) is morally problematic 
even where the agent judges that doing x (or not doing y) is the right thing to do, then it is (at 
least) equally problematic where the agent judges that doing x (or not doing y) is either 
straightforwardly morally wrong or an option that should not be taken. Accordingly, where 
there is any reasonable doubt about the measures ostensibly employed to protect the GCAs, 
technologically managed prevention probably should be a last resort. 
Thirdly, it is important that technologically managed prevention is employed in a way that 
maintains a clear and intelligible connection with the community’s moral narrative. What this 
means is that its preventive measures are clearly designed to protect the GCAs, and that the 
members of the community retain the sense of why it is necessary to restrict agents’ practical 
options in this way. Reliance on technology might be fine but there is a downside if agents lose 
their previous skills or know-how, or if they forget the moral rationale for what is now the way 
that things are (Carr, 2014). 
5. Conclusion 
In the context of the development of new technologies that invite application as regulatory 
tools, we have tried in this paper both to strengthen and to broaden the critique of preventive 
and predictive justice presented by Bernard Harcourt and by Andrew Ashworth and Lucia 
Zedner.  
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First, we have suggested that a Gewirthian theory of criminal justice is available to respond to 
those who question building an argument on liberal values and respect for human rights. While 
this theory is presented here in a defensive mode, it can (and should) be employed offensively 
to challenge positions that fail to recognise the privileged nature of the GCAs and the 
imperative of the PGC.  
Secondly, we have indicated how a Gewirthian view of the relationship between punitive and 
preventive justice supports the logic of referring to the principles that guide the former as a 
benchmark for the latter; and, we have suggested some particular principles of preventive 
justice where the restrictions are targeted at individual agents (whether in their own right or as 
members of classes). 
Thirdly, we have broadened the scope of the debate by going beyond preventive measures that 
rely on rules and orders, even rules and orders that are assisted by new technological 
instruments. Highlighting the potential use of technological management (where the strategy 
is to eliminate practical options), we have suggested that, although such a preventive approach 
changes the complexion of the regulatory environment in ways that might be a challenge to a 
Gewirthian moral community, it should not be categorically rejected. Crucially, technological 
management, like other preventive strategies, needs to be integrated into the community’s 
moral narrative and authorised only to the extent that it is compatible with the governing moral 
principles. 
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